American Religion and the Architecture of Empire
Today's guest post from Sylvester Johnson of Northwestern University continues our discussion from October emanating from the new Religion and Empire group, headed up by Sylvester and Tracy Leavelle, and including several of our bloggers in the discussion.
American
Religion and the Architecture of US Empire
Among the major shifts in twentieth century US religion was the movement
of Christian fundamentalism from the margins to the center of national culture.
Recent scholarship on this transformation ably demonstrates that the decades
following the Scopes trial (a low-tide marker of fundamentalism’s public
status) witnessed a ground-shift whereby Christian fundamentalism began to
command the public meaning of the faith. By the time the civil rights movement
had peaked in the mid-1960s, the legacy status of social gospel Christianity
was firmly undone. The struggle over the public meaning of Christianity was largely
fought between advocates of the social gospel, of which the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference was emblematic, and fundamentalists (represented by the
likes of Jerry Falwell, Billy Graham, and Joseph H. Jackson) who were
determined to reclaim Christianity from liberal theology. It was evident even
then that fundamentalism had established the upper-hand in a battle that would
have lasting significance for political religion in the US.[1]
Among the multiple factors in this triumph of fundamentalism was US
empire. It is no accident that fundamentalism came of age during the era of the
Cold War. This was the very time the US amassed its nuclear armament, implemented
forward deployment of bases and weapons, and asserted multiple points of
resistance (political, military, and economic) against the only other
superpower that seemed to match its military might—the Soviet Union. Understanding
the intersection of US empire and the tectonic shift that occurred in American
Christianity provides an occasion to discern an important dimension of the
architecture of US empire.
As a more militant form of American Christianity, borne out of a sense
of besiegement by anti-Christian forces, fundamentalism easily absorbed and
embraced the bromides of anti-Communism that defined the Cold War era.
Communism was godless, so the reasoning went, but the US was a Christian
nation. In this environment, the champions of fundamentalism were easy victors
in the race to articulate an ultra-nationalist Christian identity that
celebrated laissez-faire capitalism, rugged individualism, free markets, and
the robust, forward-deployed militarism that was needed to defend these
freedoms.
At the center of this movement was Billy Graham, a revivalist par
excellence of international renown. Graham had been mediocre in his impact
until 1949, when he launched a historic, eight-week revival that rocked Los
Angeles and permanently transformed him from a marginal preacher to the most
influential revivalist of the Cold War era. Rather serendipitously, just two
days before Graham started his revival, US officials announced that the Soviet
Union had successfully detonated an atomic bomb (weeks earlier). Strange as it
may sound, Graham made the imperial struggle between the US and the Soviet
Union central to his message. Warning that the city of Los Angeles was being
targeted for a possible nuclear strike, he urged his audience to recognize that
the nation needed Jesus to avert a global disaster. And he delicately but
persuasively linked the geopolitics of the age to the question of a personal
relationship with Jesus. From that moment, this strain of American Christianity
became, among other things, a movement for religious nationalism. It was not
the first time that Christian nationalism had operated at the center of public
religion, but it was the first time the US had verged on the status of being unsurpassed
in its global might.[2]
Christian fundamentalism was not merely being masked with a veneer of
nationalism. Rather, membership in the political community of the West and
particularly in the US body politic was being recoded through the meanings and
aspirations of Christian fundamentalism. Within the context of a rapidly
expanding security state (formalized with the National Security Act of 1947),
McCarthyism, and the escalating repression of US citizens suspected of
Communist affiliations, this Christian fundamentalism that was being forged
within the crucible of imperial rationalities easily trumped its alternatives
in the public square. Next to the social gospel and other forms of liberal
Christian theology, fundamentalism easily won the day by promising to safeguard
a putatively Christian America against the threat of annihilation by “godless
Communism.” As an index of the times, one should recall the quick passage of
legislation to insert “under God” (at President Eisenhower’s bidding in 1954) into
the US pledge of allegiance and to print “In God We Trust” on all US currency (this had previously
been reserved for metal coins) in 1955—US Congress went on to designate this as
the national motto in 1956.[3]
So, how was this related to the architecture (the specific
institutional structures and political formations) of US empire? And what was
the nature of this architecture? It is to that issue I will turn in next
month’s blog. So, stay tuned….
Randall Balmer, The Making of Evangelicalism: From
Revivalism to Politics and Beyond (Baylor University Press, 2010); Joel A. Carpenter, Revive
Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997). Michael Lienesch, In the Beginning: Fundamentalism, the Scopes Trial, and the Making of
the Antievolution Movement (University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
[2] “Evangelist Opens Revival
Crusade,” Los Angeles Times 26
September 1949. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1986). Michael G. Long, The Legacy of Billy
Graham: Critical Reflections on America’s Greatest Evangelist (Westminster
John Knox Press, 2008).
[3] Daniel K. Williams, God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian
Right (Oxford University Press, 2012).
Comments
Two observations:
1. Use of the "fundamentalism" label might be problematic given that we still haven't settled the debate between Ernest Sandeen and George Marsden--between narrow use of the term to describe premillennial dispensationalists and Marsden's broader equation of fundamentalism with anti-modernism. This isn't that big a deal, as I see it; but I suspect scholars of fundamentalism and evangelicalism will push back and miss the bigger point about Christian nationalism's role in the American Century.
2. Christian nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s was not a possession of fundamentalists alone, but much of the mainline and ecumenical leadership also subscribed to a cosmopolitan formulation of Christian nationalism. Take the NCC's inaugural 1950s slogan, "the building of a Christian America in a Christian World." Or, take the mainline's general support for Billy Graham--support he actively courted at least through the 1957 meetings in NYC (See Mark Silk's Spiritual Politics or Thomas Berg's "Proclaiming Together" RAAC essay on this). To what extent the fundamentalists could draw from mainline and ecumenical forms of Christian nationalism is a subject worthy of more research. At the very least, we need to understand the long, bipartisan history of Christian nationalism in America. Michael Thompson of the University of Sydney and I are just beginning to develop an edited collection on the very subject.
The "context," presumably a link between McCarthyism and "fundamentalism," needs to be fleshed out a bit more. For instance, Joe McCarthy was Catholic, Roy Cohn Jewish. Anti-communism--even of the excessive kind--was quite ecumenical.
As for the attempt to limn a post-WWII fundamentalist movement with Billy Graham at its center, first we must note that in the 21st century, "fundamentalist" is a largely a pejorative and so the entire enterprise carries a color of condemnation, whether intended by the author or not.
If "godless Communism" requites scare quotes--for it was indeed godless--the central term of "fundamentalism" requires careful handling as well.
Reading this essay, some gentle readers might even get the impression that Dr. Johnson holds a rather Manichean animus against his subject.
Further, it's unwise to assess the history of postwar "conservatism" in a vacuum--instead of an "end of history" with the final defeat of those perpetually troublemaking Germans, the rise of the Soviet empire represented an even greater existential threat, not just a geo-political bad actor but a international ideology as well.
That Billy Graham launched himself into the stratosphere contemporaneously with the Soviets getting the bomb is a significant observation, and a great fulcrum for a thesis. That Sovietism was totalitarian, godless--"humanistic" if you will--is also part of the greater Judeo-Christian [for lack of a better term] West's battle with modernity. The Monkey Trial wasn't just about the Bible, it was about modernity's vision of man, explainable by biology alone, obviating if not abolishing teleology and metaphysics.
Of course multiple secular forces have contributed to populist imperialism. But so has Christian fundamentalism. And I have sought to discuss an important linkage that this movement shared with larger geopolitical interests, and to do so in the space of a brief blog post. It is my hope that non-reductionist accounts focusing on religion--which I understand to be already constituted in part by secular forms--can still emerge without being equated with ghettoizing religion.
On a different score, Communism was not a monolith. What the US state referred to as Communism included a range of anticolonial movements throughout the globe, in Asia, Africa, and the Americas (including the US). Latin America, in fact, was shaped by a robust Christian Communist movement (these were theists, in other words), which is just one reason why "godless Communism" is in quotes. This is why it is important to distinguish between secular Marxism and Communism--the former has necessarily enjoined a rejection of theism and institutional religion, but not necessarily the latter. There was never a monolithic, international threat of Communism. There were, however, scores of Communist-identified movements in multiple continents.
Thanks for this feedback. I welcome the continued, critical engagement.