Religion and US Empire
Today's guest post comes from Sylvester A. Johnson, author of The Myth of Ham and professor at Northwestern University. With Tracy Neal Leavelle (author of The Catholic Calumet), Professor Johnson is heading a new initiative in US religious history "Religion and US Empire." With a group of fellows, an AAR panel, and plans for more, "Religion and US Empire" endeavors to transform how we write and teach on religion, empire, and the two together and in tension.
“Religion and US Empire”
by Sylvester A. Johnson
Ask virtually
any student of classical antiquity about Roman society, and you will hear a
common refrain: Rome was an empire. Virtually every scholarly study of ancient
Roman society, whether examining gender or material culture or religion or
philosophy, begins by attending to the significance of Rome’s status as an
empire, and with good reason. Empires involve a scale and architecture of power
across multiple domains that affect every aspect of life. This is especially
true of religion. Since the Roman Empire’s decline, a number of other “greats”
have risen and fallen—the Byzantines, the Mongolians, the Ottomans, and the
British, to name a few. Historians have repeatedly recognized that the US
emerged from the Cold War the decisive victor as the world’s leading
superpower. Since 9/11, especially, it has become commonplace for scholars to
recognize that the US is an empire—the world’s most powerful—and to examine
what this means for economics, politics, culture, human rights, etc.
Unlike the case
of ancient Rome, however, the study of religion
and US empire is an intersection to which scholars overwhelmingly prefer a
detour. Such studies do exist—among the more notable are Martin Marty’s Righteous Empire (1970), Cornel West’s Democracy Matters (2005), Mark Taylor’s Religion, Politics, and the Christian Right:
Post-9/11 Powers and American Empire (2005); Rosemary Reuther’s America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and
Imperial Violence (2007); Vincent Rougeau’s Christians in the American Empire: Faith and Citizenship in the New
World Order (2008); and Jon Pahl’s Empire
of Sacrifice (2010). But the sheer paucity of these studies is striking. Of
the hundreds of studies of US empire that have emerged over the past decade, a only
mere handful examine the intersection with religion. Or, to phrase the same
problem differently, for the vast majority of scholars of US religion, it seems
to matter little if at all that the US is an empire.[1]
Despite this
dearth of studies, there are overwhelming reasons for scholars of US religion to
engage richly with the significance of US America’s status as an empire. Since
its inception as a nation-state, the US has existed as an empire, dominating
external polities such as Native American nations as a means of nationalist
expansion while simultaneously administering control over “internal”
populations—American Indians and Africans—as outsiders alien to the body
politic. The expansive growth of the nation in the decades following its
founding both inspired and benefited from America’s religious movements.
Perhaps the most significant in the early 1800s was the American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). This missionary society was the
first to focus on exporting US religion to foreign populations, including
Native Americans and peoples around the world. The ABCFM was in every sense the
American rival of the older, more established foreign missionary societies of
Europe.
Throughout the
1800s, the expanding US Empire shaped in fundamental ways the religious history
of Mormons and American Indians in the western territories. The US imperial war
with the Republic of Mexico in the 1840s severed away nearly half that nation’s
territory and placed it under US rule. So-called frontier religion and the
interracial formations of power, dissension, and alliance in places like
California, Kansas, and New Mexico emerged through histories of military
occupation, imperial imaginaries, and settler paradigms. The US missionary presence
in Hawaii and the creation of Liberia as a Black Christian settler state are
further examples of this intersection. By 1885, Josiah Strong could author Our Country under the guiding assumption
that empire was the essential architecture through which what he called
Anglo-Saxon Christianity was to be fully realized. The intersection of religion
and empire is further attested by the tragic history of Wounded Knee in 1890
and the US acquisition of the Philippines in the 1890s.
In the wake of
the Second World War, the US began to solidify a global constellation of
military bases that today number more than 1,000. The US defined its global
mission as containing and defeating Communism and socialist-inspired political
and land reform movements throughout the Third World. Establishing proxy
governments quickly emerged as the premier means of controlling global
geopolitics. This shift created a political order rooted in making formally
sovereign polities into US satellite states. This enabled a fundamental shift
in the theological imagination of US power. In the 1950s and 1960s, figures
like Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell embodied the rising tide of political
Christianity that linked the US effort to become the most powerful empire to
the religious grammatology of Manichaean struggle against ultimate evil. An
explicitly religious tenor began to accrue in the substance and fervor of US
foreign policy, preeminently rendering US national security as a multifold
response to the “godless Communism” that threatened to destroy what was
frequently described as the American way or the heritage of “a Christian
nation.”
The internal
changes in American public religion were transformative and indelible. By the
1980s, historians who had long lamented the decline of American public religion
beneath the advent of secularization (the now-discredited secularization
thesis) were suddenly struggling to explain how they had so fundamentally
misdiagnosed the reality. Religion was patently a ubiquitous force in American
politics. The consequences for religion were equally significant abroad. In
Latin America, for instance, American Christian missionaries busied themselves
with converting populations who promoted liberation theology within Third World
Catholicism. Their evangelical critique of Catholicism was explicitly aligned
with the interests of US capital and US militarism. In unexpected ways, the
ascent of US hegemony had shaped the very terms through which US religious
actors would align themselves as conservatives or progressives. And as is now
evident, the triumph of fundamentalism in the US was enabled by the Cold War
and specific formations of US hegemony.
In the post-9/11
era, it has become somewhat easier to identify the linkages between religion and
US empire, or at least to appreciate that their intersection merits serious
study. As I stated earlier, 9/11 has been the most important catalyst for
propelling scholarly attention toward the intersection of religion and US
empire. But our work to produce scholarship that elucidates the forms and
consequences of this intersection has barely begun. Yet, if there has ever been
a “moment” for scholars of religion to tackle this problem, it is now. Just
last week, fifteen scholars of American religion convened at Creighton
University in Omaha, Nebraska to inaugurate a collaborative effort (see www.religionandusempire.org) to
examine what it means for American religion that the US is an empire. Over the
next few years, this group will focus on the multiple ways that religion and
empire have intersected to shape the history, culture, and textures of US
society. This is just one sign of a larger trend in which American religion
scholars are seeking to understand with renewed vigor why empire matters for
the history of religion and how integral religion has been to the long arc of
US empire.
[1] Prominent examples are Cultures
of United States Imperialism (1993), edited by Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease;
Alfred McCoy’s Policing America’s Empire
(2009); Colonial Crucible: Empire in the
Making of the Modern American State (2009), edited by Alfred McCoy and
Francisco Scarano; and Richard Immerman’s Empire
for Liberty (2010). Bernard Porter’s Empire
and Superempire (2006) and Charles Maier’s Among Empires (2006). For a comprehensive historiographical
discussion, see Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the
United States in the World,” American
Historical Review 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1348–91.
Comments
For example:
by Paul Schroeder
Mr. Schroeder is Professor Emeritus of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
At the January meeting of the American Historical Association Professor Schroeder gave an electrifying address on the differences between imperialism and hegemony. AHA President Lynn Hunt ran up to him afterwards to implore him to write an op-ed. At our request, he did so.
_____________
"American Empire is the current rage--whether hailed or denounced, accepted as inevitable or greeted as an historic opportunity. Common to the discourse is an assumption, shared also by friends and foes abroad, that America already enjoys a world-imperial position and is launched on an imperial course.
But that assumption involves another: that America is already an empire simply by being the world's only superpower, by virtue of its military supremacy, economic power, global influence, technological and scientific prowess, and world-wide alliances. The term "empire," in short, describes America's current condition and world status, and is equivalent to phrases like "unipolar moment" or "unchallenged hegemony."
This is a misleading, unhistorical understanding of empire, ignoring crucial distinctions between empire and other relationships in international affairs and obscuring vital truths about the fate of empires and bids for empire within the modern international system. A better understanding of empire can point us to historical generalizations we ignore at our peril."
&c.
http://hnn.us/article/1237#sthash.UTsxGZiQ.dpuf
In the least, if one wants to argue "religion and empire" outside one's circle, effort must be made toward establishing the latter premise.
In American Umpire, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman offers a sweeping, wide-ranging, and remarkably in-depth overview of the history of American foreign relations. In a work bound to inspire fierce debate, Hoffman, the Dwight E. Stanford Professor of American Foreign Relations at San Diego State University and a National Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, argues that those that criticize America’s role in the world have it all wrong: “One of the most commonly held scholarly assumptions of our day -- that the United States is a kind of empire -- is not simply improbable but false” (5). Above all, critics do not understand America’s history.
...
In her conclusion, “Good Calls, Bad, Calls, and Rules in Flux; Or, Who Wants to Be Ump? 1991–Present,” Hoffman argues, post 9/11, that “calling the United States an empire has yielded no practical solutions because the nation and the world system in which it fits are simply not structured in that way.” Instead, Hoffman sees America as “the enforcer of what is, most of the time, the collective will: the maintenance of a world system with relatively open trade borders, in which arbitration and economic sanctions are the preferred method of keeping the peace and greater and greater numbers of people have at least some political rights.” Critiquing Williams, Hoffman argues that “American diplomacy in the twentieth century has been far more triumphant than tragic.” America is not an Empire, but rather a “player-umpire.” This is “not completely fair to anyone, the umpire or the other players. But it is often better than having no ump at all” (336-352)
http://hnn.us/article/152676
The scholarship on US empire is by no means rooted in a fixation on "emperors." (The term empire derives from the Latin imperium, which refers to a form of political power, not to an emperor). Empire rather denotes a polity (i.e., a state, not a person) that dominates people(s) while rendering them external and alien to the political community through which the dominating polity is conceived. Empires are constituted when a state dominates a people (i.e., a polity) through the colonial relation of power. This is why there could be an anticolonial movement in the Gold Coast that opposed British imperialism in the 1950s. There was no British emperor in the 1950s (Britain was a parliamentary democracy), nor was there any emperor of France in the 1950s and 1960s, when Algerians waged a war against French imperialism to create an independent republic of Algeria. For an elaborate account of this colonial relation, readers of this blog are encouraged to consult Michael Hechter's Internal Colonialism; David Goldberg's Racial State, and Achille Mbembe's Postcolony. Also important is Michel Foucault's Il faut defendre la societé (available in English translation as Society Must Be Defended), based on his lectures at the Collège de France.
The scholarship on US empire is by no means rooted in a fixation on "emperors." (The term empire derives from the Latin imperium, which refers to a form of political power, not to an emperor). Empire rather denotes a polity (i.e., a state, not a person) that dominates people(s) while rendering them external and alien to the political community through which the dominating polity is conceived. Empires are constituted when a state dominates a people (i.e., a polity) through the colonial relation of power. This is why there could be an anticolonial movement in the Gold Coast that opposed British imperialism in the 1950s. There was no British emperor in the 1950s (Britain was a parliamentary democracy), nor was there any emperor of France in the 1950s and 1960s, when Algerians waged a war against French imperialism to create an independent republic of Algeria. For an elaborate account of this colonial relation, readers of this blog are encouraged to consult Michael Hechter's Internal Colonialism; David Goldberg's Racial State, and Achille Mbembe's Postcolony. Also important is Michel Foucault's Il faut defendre la societé (available in English translation as Society Must Be Defended), based on his lectures at the Collège de France.