Needing Niebuhr Still?
By Mark Edwards
The immediate occasion for this post is a shameless plug. Among
the many panels put together for the 2013 AHA and its affiliates on the subject
of religion, I want to highlight The Christian Origins of the American Century, which will feature papers by
Cara Burnidge, Caitlin Carenen, and myself, and commentary by Malcolm Magee and
Andrew Preston. It’s a bit early in the
morning, but Darren Dochuk has offered to buy attendees coffee and a scone, so
it’s all good. In the meantime, and to
cover my shameless plug in robes of serious historical inquiry, I thought I’d
revisit a question that Randall Stephens took up a few years ago:
After all these years, why is Reinhold Niebuhr still America’s premier public
theologian and, more importantly, what does that say about us?
This is how I introduce Niebuhr and Christian power
politics in my AHA essay:
Who would Jesus nuke? That’s a question that comes to mind when you
hear the phrase, “Christian power politics.”
And the solution is Reinhold Niebuhr.
At least, looking lately across the American political spectrum, it
seems Niebuhr still knows whom Jesus would waste. Niebuhr’s official foray into realpolitik
began in 1932 with the publication of Moral Man and Immoral Society. Niebuhr therein drew a sharp line between
religious and political morality. It was
one thing to preach “love thy neighbor” when that neighbor was a person or
family; but how could labor love management?
How could America love Japan, especially in 1932, or vice versa? In other words, Jesus’s personal morality,
however noble, had little relevance for social and diplomatic problems which
were always collective in nature.
Niebuhr scored anti-pacifist points in service of an independent and
aggressive farm-labor movement, unafraid to use violence to achieve social
justice. Niebuhr would soon after
reframe his arguments to justify American intervention into World War II and
against Soviet expansion. Niebuhr’s thought remains prized today by the left,
right, and center. One would think the
entire scope of political theology could be reduced to the question, What Would
Niebuhr Do—although the answers to that question have given rise to a host of
unholy contradiction. But what was
“Christian” about Niebuhr’s power politics?
Sure, he talked a lot about needing to control the effects of original
sin, but his closest friends (including Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.) found
Niebuhr’s whole theological superstructure irrelevant to his base
Machiavellianism. No wonder that Barak
Obama has deployed Niebuhr in defense of a nation with the soul of a predator
drone.
The paper then proceeds as one more of my feeble attempts to
exalt World ‘s Student Christian Federation chairman Francis Pickens Miller as
a co-founder of post-World War I Christian Realism. The irony of this American historian, though,
is that I ask myself all the time, What Niebuhr Would Do? The potential of Niebuhrian realism to moderate
and, when necessary, frustrate groupthink is indispensable. I’ve found that to be as true of
faculty-administration clashes as of political partisanship and imperial
rivalries.
And I’m not the only one who still looks up to “the modern
Socrates of sin” (as one student once lionized Niebuhr in a poem). During and after his lifetime, Niebuhr was
the subject of literally thousands of short and lengthy investigations. Richard Fox’s Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (1985) reigns supreme among
comprehensive Niebuhr studies despite several notable efforts by Ronald Stone
and others to topple it. Fox was sensitive
to the “great man” history charge as well as to the need to evade presentism;
but was it an accident that the biography appeared in the midst of the Reagan
administration’s re-ideologizing of the Cold War? In any case, it seems Niebuhr resurfaces
whenever someone feels that America needs a kick to its exceptional head. Three recent Niebuhr studies—Martin
Halliwell’s The Constant Dialogue
(2005), Charles Lemert’s Why Niebuhr
Matters (2011), and John Patrick Diggins’s Why Niebuhr Now? (2011)—testify to an abiding zeal for explaining
and updating Niebuhr for future generations.
However, as Paul Elie has noted, everyone today wants to
claim a piece of the Niebuhrian realist legacy.
Those viewing Niebuhr as a pre-critic of the war on terror—including
Andrew Bacevich’s The Limits of Power
(2008), Eric Patterson’s edited collection, Christianity
and Power Politics Today (2008), and Ray Haberski’s God and War (2012)—are winning the day over assumed neo-and
theocons.
Yet my question is: what questions aren’t we asking when
we’re wondering what Niebuhr would do?
Was Francis Miller right when he complained in 1933 that Niebuhr "had no
theory of the church"—that Niebuhr’s devout faith in the nation-state was
ultimately a betrayal of the transnational forms of community that Christians
should be trading in? Was and is Niebuhr
and his followers addicts of what Stanley Hauerwas once christened “Constantinian
power?” Is it finally time to admit with
James Cone that “God cannot be white”—that the only “Christian” politics worth
investing in should seek liberation for those crushed by coercive structures
such as whiteness? To do so would not
necessarily be to repudiate Niebuhr as much as re-read and re-utilize him. While Bacevich has proclaimed Niebuhr’s Irony of American History (1952) the
most important work in American foreign policy, the radical theologians of the
1960s, as well as Niebuhr’s colleague and confidant John Bennett, tried to
point people back to Moral Man.
With all that said, do you find Niebuhr more of an asset or
liability to current political theology?
Should he be dethroned? If not,
why not? If so, replaced by who or what?
(PS I just discovered
that Elesha Coffman’s The Christian Century and the Rise of the Protestant Mainline, Oxford, May 2013, is
available for preorder. It joins a
number of new studies promising to move study of ecumenical Protestantism
beyond the “history of theology” approach—which Niebuhr, too, has dominated.)
Comments
http://www.politicaltheology.com/blog/
Thanks again,
Dave True,
Editor, Political Theology
david.true@wilson.edu
The question that I have wrestled with, like you, is the attempt to find an alternative to Niebuhr. For me, one episode that revealed the contours of that attempt was the debate between Richard John Neuhaus and Stan Hauerwas over the first Gulf War. I wrote about it at S-USIH: http://us-intellectual-history.blogspot.com/2011/06/war-and-we.html
What struck me as significant was the reductionism on both sides of the debate. Niebuhr responded to world affairs in his own time and of course did not imagine he was writing for American theologians of other times, much less those facing the Gulf War. But more than that, as you point out, while Niebuhr had offered a profound theological reflection in Moral Man, he wrote so much more that there is a seemingly a Niebuhr for any given situation. For his moment, when mainline Protestantism reigned in America, his voice could make a thumping difference. Neuhaus harkened back to that kind of authority; Hauerwas antagonized it. I think the debate taken up in many of the book you refer to is over whether the history since Niebuhr is a declension narrative or a something much more positive.
In other words, Niebuhr will always be interesting to read because he wrote so much, but our use of him says more about us than him.
Your point is certainly well taken as far as the development of the welfare state is concerned. I still tend to marvel with Owen Chadwick, Andrew Preston, Heather Warren, Dianne Kirby, Phillip Coupland, among others, at how mainliners involved themselves in foreign policy inner circles around World War II. I mean less Niebuhr here and more Henry Van Dusen and Francis Miller. My second book looks to explore the connections between ecumenical Protestants and foreign policy thinktanks like the Council on Foreign Relations. Miller's relationship with Henry Wallace as one example of this close connection. The question is: When did that "special relationship" end? I'm thinking when the John Foster Dulles types (aristocrats) were replaced by JFK's "whiz kids" and Rumsfeld types (technocrats).
Granted, mainline thinkers were remarkably involved in mid 20th century foreign policy, and it's a topic I should know more about. I still have to wonder, though, how different this was from the days of Josiah Strong and Albert Beveridge and Alfred Mahan, of missionaries and the sons of missionaries steering affairs in Hawaii, of Sheldon Jackson running Alaska, even, considering relations with Indian nations as a foreign policy matter, of U.S. Grant's outsourcing of Indian affairs to churches. It seems that the scale of U.S. foreign policy and the relationship between "religious" and "political" leaders had changed more between the 19th and mid-20th century than had Protestant involvement in policy discussions. The contrast between the Niebuhr era and the technocrat era seems much sharper than the shifts that went before it, and seems like a bigger deal (to me) when the long history is taken into consideration. If Niebuhr et al were not anomalously influential, but the apotheosis of a long and deep tradition, the sudden (though hardly complete, given Niebuhr's remaining stature) repudiation of that tradition is shocking indeed. I look forward to learning from the panel!