Of Intolerance, Hate Crimes, and Beards: Boundaries of Inclusion and Tolerance in American History and the American Present
Today's guest post is from Barton E. Price, a Visiting Assistant Professor of History at Grand Valley State University. He would like to thank his students for indulging his interests in these disparate topics and having discussions about them.
The last two weeks have been momentous ones for the history of American religious tolerance and intolerance, in case
you missed it. Thursday the 20th marked the one-year anniversary of
the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.
In this landmark reversal, homosexuals were allowed participation in the
military without fear of being “outed” and then discharged. The anniversary of
this repeal prompted me to think about other important decisions that have an
effect on American society. Namely, I am drawn to think about the intersection
of religion, American history, and individual civil rights.
In Maryland, there is a referendum to legalize
(or not) gay marriages in this state. As I see it, the issue of gay marriage
boils down to a basic civil rights question. Do homosexual persons have the
same rights and privileges accorded to them as citizens of the United States
regardless of their sexual identity? I think that the rights of citizens are an
ironclad guarantee so long as those persons are not criminals or enemies of the
state. I do not see how homosexuals fit either of those criteria on the basis
of their sexuality. So, it would seem to me that the logical answer to my
question is that yes homosexuals should have the legal protection to marry. I
do not see this issue as a religious one. Nor should it be.
But the Maryland case is an interesting one because it
invites us to think about religion and civil rights. I recall months ago
watching the news and hearing proponents of legalizing gay marriage claim that
this legalization would be a continuation of the arc of justice in Maryland
since the Act of Toleration in 1649
(interestingly enough, it was passed September 21, 1649). I chuckled to myself,
as I had just covered that document in American History to 1877 course. As it
turns out, the Act of Toleration is not a good example to use to support the
case for same-sex marriage. If one reads the document closely, it appears to be
a seventeenth-century version of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.
Speaking of Toleration, or rather intolerance, the senate
held its hearing on the shooting
at a Sikh temple as a hate crime. This hearing commenced on Wednesday, the 19th.
Like many, I was horrified to hear about the deaths of Sikhs. Equally
horrifying was that persistent Islamophobia
undergirded the assailant’s attack. Page’s mistake in incorrectly identifying
Sikhs as Muslims is unfortunate, and I have to say that I do not condone
attacks on anyone on account of their religious identification. But this is not
the first time that Sikhs have been wrongly identified according to racial and
religious markers.
In my Intro to American Civilization class this semester, we
studied a unit on the history of naturalization and citizenship. One common
theme we discussed was race and ethnicity (e.g. Chinese Exclusion Act, National
Origins Act). I also gave them case law from the Supreme Court. One case in
particular fascinated me as I was preparing my course in early August. That is
the case of Bhagat Singh Thind, an
immigrant to the United States from Punjab. He had served the U.S. in World War
I, had attended UC Berkeley, and was otherwise an upstanding member of society.
According to naturalization laws in 1917 that granted citizenship to Native
Americans if they served in the military, Thind applied for citizenship. He was
denied on account of his race. The case goes that Thind argued that he was
white (a qualifier in all naturalization laws since 1790) because he was of
Caucasian ethnicity. He had legal precedent to support this claim. The previous
year, the Supreme Court decided in Ozawa that a Japanese immigrant—while
having light skin—was not white because he was not Caucasian. Thind’s lawyer
thought that he had a tight case. Thind lost. The court determined that white
and Caucasian were exclusively the domains of people from northwestern Europe
and their descendents in the American continents. As appalling as this decision
is, it is even more appalling when we consider that the court declined to
recognize Thind’s actual religious tradition. Thind was a Sikh. The court,
however, stated:
“It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge
that the physical group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily
distinguishable from the various groups of persons in this country commonly
recognized as white.”
I’m not exactly sure what “physical group characteristics”
the court had in mind. My best guess would be the turban and beard.
Nevertheless, this case—and the shooting in Wisconsin—point to a longstanding
misunderstanding of Sikh religious identity vis-Ã -vis their Hindu and Muslim
neighbors.
Lastly, speaking of intolerance, hate crimes, and beards, on
Thursday the 20th, the jury in a federal court found seventeen Amish men guilty
of hate crimes for shaving off the beards of other Amish men. Interestingly
enough, the suspects were tried in accordance with the Matthew Shepherd Hate
Crimes Act.
This is not just a curiosity. Instead it invites us to think
about embodied religious practices (including facial hair), masculinity, and
the role of the law in handling religious disputes. The prosecutor was quoted
last fall saying that religious disputes over ideas handled in a sharing of
words was acceptable. But acts of physical violence in these disputes was not.
Are we to assume that the courts are—once again—taking on the role of defining
religious practice? It would appear so. This case offers us a new avenue to
explore some of these important themes. I call dibs.
So, these last few weeks have been important as we continue to
think about religion, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. As historians, we must
consider the contingencies, contexts, and continuities of limited tolerance in
America’s past and work to reveal those limitations if we are to push the
boundaries of inclusion.
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